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Abstract The topic of our analysis is the argument for the existence of substances
given by Bernard Bolzano in Athanasia (1827), where he essentially employs two
ontological categories: substance and adherence. Bolzano considers the real and con-
ditioned Inbegriff of all adherences, which are wirklich and nicht selbst bestehen.
He claims that the formed collection is dependent on something external and non-
adherential, which therefore is a substance. Bolzano’s argumentation turns out to
be structurally similar to his argument for the existence of God from Lehrbuch der
Religionswissenschaft (1834), but in each of these reasonings, we find different plau-
sible interpretations of the key concept “Inbegriff”. The latter argumentation refers to
the mereological totality of existentially conditioned objects. We propose the expli-
cation of the Bolzanian Inbegriff of all adherences using two types of predication: we
consider its extension as composed of certain intensional counterparts of adherences.
In our approach, we use a fragment of the theory of abstract objects formulated by E.
Zalta (1983), describing two different relations between individuals and properties:
extensional exemplification and intensional encoding. We put our reconstruction in a
wider context of Bolzano’s ontology, formulating the needed axioms with two primi-
tive predicates of second order ... is an adherence, ... is conditioned by something real
as well as the conditionally introduced first order predicate constant In for Inbegriff
of all adherential ideas. Finally, we sketch a model for our theory.
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We take into consideration a fragment of B. Bolzano’s ontology, which essentially
employs two ontological categories: substance (Substanz) and adherence (Adhärenz).
The notion of adherence is involved in a formulation of the argument for the existence
of substances given by Bolzano in Athanasia (1827) and this reasoning is formalized
in the present paper.
A key concept of the considered argumentation is the notion of Inbegriff of all
adherences — real attributes of real objects (possibly other real attributes). The
totality of them is also real and conditioned. However, its conditions cannot be
adherences, which are already included into it. All reals are either adherences or
substances, so the formed Inbegriff must be conditioned by (at least one) substance.
In our attempt to reconstruct Bolzano’s discourse, we are inspired by its simi-
larity to the argument for the existence of God given by Bolzano in Lehrbuch der
Religionswissenschaft (1834, 177–179). In the latter case, Bolzano also used the
notion of Inbegriff to come to the main existential conclusion. He formed it out of
all conditioned beings and argued that the reality of this Inbegriff is dependent on
something real but external, in conclusion: on some unconditioned being, which he
assumed to be God. A reconstruction showing some plausible path of this reasoning
can be done in frame of a certain extension of mereology based on Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory (ZF) as S´wie˛torzecka (2014). We will propose a few similar steps in the
present approach. However, the argument for the existence of substances has also its
specificity connected with the nature of Inbegriff of all adherences. The totality of all
conditioned beings in the argument for the existence of God can be identified with
their mereological collection, but this does not seem to be an adequate manner of
speaking when we collect adherences understood by Bolzano as some special proper-
ties of beings. Actually, properties may be described in an extensional or intensional
way, and we suppose that just the combination of these two approaches is involved in
the analyzed reasoning. Speaking of adherences, Bolzano perhaps followed his dis-
tinction which allowed him to consider them as predicated to some real individuals
but also as represented by a sort of ideas in themselves (Ideen an sich). Ideas were
components of his ontology and some of them could be mentioned just as intensional
counterparts of adherences. Our proposal is to focus on these intensional character-
izations and to recognize them as exemplifications of Bolzanian Inbegriff. We base
our description on some part of the theory of abstract object by E. Zalta (1983) which
allows us to express the distinction between extensional and intensional predication.
We are going to show that the apparatus of Zalta’s theory gives the possibility to trace
the subsequent steps of Bolzano’s argumentation and to notice their similarity to the
structure of his argument for the existence of God.
1 The Original Argument and a Few Preformal Supplements
One might ask why the existence of substances was not evident enough for Bolzano,
and why he formulated arguments for their existence. Actually, he used the term
“substance” in two meanings, speaking of simple and complex substances (Bolzano
1851, §50–65). Simple substances were understood as everlasting, eternal individu-
als, similar to Leibnizian monads but possessing windows: they stayed in a causal
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relationship with other substances.1 Complex substances were regarded by Bolzano
as aggregates of an infinite number of simple substances. In fact, it could be said that
arguing for the existence of the latter is not trivial, because simple substances are not
visible and cannot be any subject of our direct experience. What can be perceived by
our senses are only aggregates and qualities. Bolzano tried to come to the consid-
ered conclusion in two ways: taking as a starting point the existence of aggregates or
the existence of qualities. He formulated the argumentation for the existence of (sim-
ple) substances based on the first assumption in his Paradoxes (Bolzano 1851, 155).
The shift from the existence of aggregates — perhaps: mereological units — to the
existence of their atoms — simple substances — was validated by a sort of a foun-
dation principle. The other alternative argument referring to the nature of substantial
qualities which “cannot exist and be actual apart from the presence of a substance
to which they can belong” was not analyzed and exploited there. However, the track
dealing with the pair substance–quality (or its certain kind named “adherence”) could
be the only one possibly successful solution if the considered universe of metaphys-
ical discourse would be composed only of simple substances (and not aggregates).
This perspective is present in Athanasia, where Bolzano undertakes the problem of
the immortality of souls mentioned just as simple substances. He formulates the
following reasoning:
Gibt es nun irgend Ein Wirkliches, so ist offenbar, daß es auch Eine oder
einige Substanzen geben müsse. Denn ein Wirkliches, das nicht Sub-
stanz ist, muß eine Adhärenz, also Beschaffenheit sein und setzet folglich
noch irgendein anderes Wirkliche, an dem es sich befindet, voraus. Dies andere
Wirkliche kann zwar abermals nur eine Adhärenz oder Beschaffenheit sein,
weil auch Beschaffenheiten noch ihre Beschaffenheiten haben, und wenn nur
jene wirklich sind, so sind es auch diese. Allein, wenn wir uns alle wirklichen
Dinge, die bloße Adhärenzen sind, in Einen Inbegriff vereinigt vorstellen, so
leuchtet bald ein, daß auch dieser nicht für sich selbst bestehen könne, sondern
erst eines oder einiger anderer wirklichen Dinge, an denen er sich befindet,
bedürfe. Dies E i n e nun, oder auch diese m e h r e n wirklichen Dinge sind
nicht mehr Adhärenzen, weil sie sonst mit zu jenem Inbegriff gezählt werden
müßten; sie sind daher Substanzen. So gewiß es also irgend Ein Wirkliches gibt,
so gewiß gibt es auch Substanzen. (Bolzano 1827, 22)
[1] If there is something real [Wirkliches], it is evident that there must
be one or more substances. [2] Because anything real which is not a
substance must be an adherence, therefore, it is a property [Beschaffenheit], and
therefore, it presupposes another real in which it occurs [befindet an]. [3] This
other real can be again only an adherence or a property, because properties
can also have their properties, and if these are real, then also the other ones.
[4] Now, if we imagine that we put together all real things, which are merely
1The very adequate comparison of Bolzanian substances with monads was proposed by R. Zimmermann
in his Leibnitz’ Monadologie. Deutsch mit einer Abhandlung über Leibnitz’ und Herbart’s Theorieen des
wirklichen Geschehens (Vienna, 1847). At that time, it was more “convenable" to refer to Herbart than
to Bolzano. Herbart actually understood the substances in the same way as Bolzano did. (I owe these
historical remarks to Professor E. Morscher.)
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adherences, in one collection [Inbegriff ], it is clear that this [collection] cannot
exist [bestehen] by itself, but it needs one or more other things in which it
occurs. [5] This one or more real things now are not adherences because they
must not belong to this collection; so they are substances. [6] Thus, if it is
certain that there is something real, it is also certain that there are substances.
This argument will be the subject of our analysis.
To give some intuitions grounding the proposed reconstruction, let us note a num-
ber of explanations of the concepts substance and adherence combined together,
given by Bolzano in different places of his work.2
The pair substance–adherence is listed in Wissenschaftslehre as categories of rela-
tion together with the pair: cause–effect and community (Bolzano 1837, vol. 1/2014,
403). Interestingly, the term “adherence” is supposed to be the original expression of
Bolzanian philosophy.3 According to W. Künne’s conjecture, Bolzano could intro-
duce “adherence” instead of the medieval term “accidence” probably to keep the
right opposition to the meaning of the term “substance” (Künne 2015). The essen-
tial feature of any substance is to exist in se, in contrast to adherences existing in
alio (although some adherences are attached to substances by necessity, for instance,
omniscience and omnipotence as attributes of God, so they are not accidental). Actu-
ally, the distinction between substances and adherences followed the Aristotelian
line, although it was refereed to the universe of Platonic individuals.
Bolzano notes the following basic features of discussed categories:
1. daß alles Wirkliche zu einer von folgenden zwei Arten gehöre, daß es
entweder Substanz oder Adhärenz sey, daß Adhärenz bloßein solches
Wirkliche heiße, das sich an einem Andern als eine Beschaffenheit dassel-
ben befindet. Was sich nicht an einem Andern befindet, sondern, wie man
dieß auszudrücken pflegt, für sich bestehet, das heißt Substanz
oder Wesen. [...], daß alles, was anfängt oder aufhört, nur eine Adhärenz sey,
während jede Substanz etwas Beständiges ist, das weder anfangen, noch verge-
hen kann, sondern, so ferne es einmal ist, zu aller Zeit seyn muß. (Bolzano
1834, §70, 185)
1. that all reals belong to one of the following two kinds, that it is
substance or adherence, that adherence is called a real, which is attached
to another thing as property. That which is not attached to another, but, as one
likes to express it, exists by itself, is called a substance or essence,
[...], that everything which begins or ends is only an adherence, whereas every
substance is something stable which cannot begin or end but, insofar as it exists
once, has to be forever.
Actually, the most extensive explanations of the considered pair are formulated in
Athanasia. The above-quoted passage is a repetition of ideas expressed there. From
2The extensive philosophical discussion with numerous references is presented by Schnieder (2002). Our
description is dictated by a formal theory given later.
3Schnieder (2006, 12) notes that later Meinong used the transitive verb “to adhere” to speak about
attributes attached to things, and just like Bolzano, he accepted that they are as real as their subjects.
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Athanasia, we also learn that adherences are real attributes (Beschaffenheiten) of real
individuals4 and that they are located on (attached to) substances or on (to) other
adherences. The relation between adherence and its subject is not transitive in the
sense that the adherence of another adherence located in a certain substance (or an
adherence) is not an adherence of the latter one. However, adherences may be subject
to a sort of importation. If we take any adherence ai , adherence aj , and substance s
such that aj is attached to s – aj (s) and if the adherence ai is attached to aj , then s
possesses the complex adherence ai(aj ) (although ai is of course not attached to s).5
Finally, Bolzano seems to claim that adherences are particulars in a sense that they
are unique attributes of particular substances (trops, cf. (Morscher 2013)).6
The relation between substance and adherence is expressed in subject-predicate
sentences of the shape A is B. When we say that A is B, the connection between A
and B should be understood in such a way that B represents one of the attributes of
an object falling under A and substantial terms cannot be instantiated under B:
[...] dass wenn der Gegensatz zwischen Substanz u. Adhärenz scharf aufgefasst
u. festgehalten werden soll, so müsste man unter Substanz lediglich nur das-
jenige Wirkliche (Seyende) verstehen, was immer nur als Subject - niemals als
Prädicat gedacht werden könne. Dieses vorausgesetzt, ist es unrichtig zu sagen,
dass auf die Frage: Was (ist dies)? je die Substanz zur Antwort komme. Denn
was auf diese Frage zur Antwort kommt, ist eine Prädikatvorstellung: das-ist-A
(hat die Beschaffenheit A), also eine Adhärenz. (Bolzano 1835, 117)
[...] if the difference between substance and adherence is precisely defined and
established, one has to understand by substance only that real which can be
thought always only as subject, never as predicate. This assumed, it is wrong to
say that for the question: What (is that)? a substance can be an answer. Because
what can be an answer to this question is a predicative idea: that - is - A (has
the Beschaffenheit A), therefore an adherence.
The intended restriction of an instantiation of B is kept by the canonical sentential
structure to which all subject-predicate sentences are reducible. Bolzano assumes
that every sentence A is B may be equivalently reformulated to the sentence A has b,
where “b represents the abstractum that belongs to the concretum B” (Bolzano 1837,
1973, 172). If b is an adherence, we say in the sentence: A has b, that b is “some
property to be found in a certain object” A, and where actually the term “has” does
4It is not clear if there are any real attributes which are not adherences (explanations given in the text
are not consequent). Bolzano sometimes uses the term “Beschaffenheit” instead of “Adhärenz” (Bolzano
1827, 21).
5Bolzano gives an example of unusual power (ai ) and memory (aj ) of any given person (s) (Bolzano 1827,
23).
6B. Schnieder notes that particularity is not considered as a defining feature of adherences, although
it may apply to adherences in view of the fact that actually, they are subjects of many observable
changes (“the colour of the flower, for example, may be paler today than it was yesterday”, cf. the
whole argument of Bolzano (1827, 23f) cited by Schnieder (2006, 12), where are also considered some
philosophical consequences of treating adherences as particular properties). However, Bolzano also gives
universals as examples of real attributes (Morscher 2013). In any event, this problem will not influence
our reconstruction of the analyzed argument.
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not mean a “possession (i.e. the capacity to make some use)” (ibid, 124). Searching
for some semantic explanation for such a vision, we should refer to specific Bolza-
nian ontology. Its domain, in addition to reality of material objects and psychical
acts, contained the special (independent of others) “realm” of propositions in them-
selves and ideas in themselves. Propositions in themselves are ideal counterparts of
sentential expressions, and ideas in themselves are the ideal objects corresponding to
components of sentences: the terms and copula “has”. Looking for some intensional
interpretation of adherential terms, we would place the ideal objects corresponding
to them somewhere in the intersection of real and concrete ideas. Actually, Bolzano
divided ideas in many different kinds (Bolzano 1837, 1973, 75–163) but we focus
just on these two mentioned types, following some explanations and examples given
by Bolzano. When we consider a situation in which person A has (the adherence or
the property of) animality, then the concretum would be an animal which would be a
real and concrete idea. It is real (as opposed to an imaginary idea, (ibid, 109–112)) in
this sense that it is non-contradictory and concrete (in distinction to an abstract idea
(ibid, 92–93)), because “an animal [is] the idea of something that has the property of
animality” (ibid, 92).7 Finally we can also say: A is an animal. On the other side, an
animal in itself does not have the property of animality, but we would rather say that
the former represents the latter. In fact, this kind of predication will play an important
role in our formalization of Bolzano’s argument.
2 Formalization
As we have already declared, we base our proposal on a certain fragment of Zalta’s
theory of abstract objects (Zalta 1983). The author of the chosen tool originally
designed it as a formal basis for the Meinongian ontology of fictional objects. He
used it (and some extensions of it) to analyze fragments of Plato’s theory of forms,
the Leibnizian monadology, and Frege’s theory of sense and denotations. Some of the
ideas involved in Zalta’s formalism were applied in his analysis of the Leibnizian the-
ory of concepts (Zalta 2000). Now, we take this frame to express a part of Bolzano’s
theory of substance and adherence, which, in fact, also has clear Platonic roots.
The specificity of Zalta’s theory is that it describes two types of predication: exten-
sional exemplification and intensional encoding (representation). They are noted by
two different concatenations of predicate and individual terms. Let us take an indi-
vidual term t and a predicate term τ . The expression τ t is used to speak about the
exemplification of the property named τ with the individual named t . We can say
that τ t is true just when the object symbolized by t belongs to the extension of the
property named τ . The intensional way of speaking is captured by the concatena-
tion tτ . In this case, the individual symbolized by t represents (encodes) the property
named τ and it belongs to the intension of this property (being its coder). Such
7There are also examples formulated by Bolzano in which abstract nouns are used as adherential terms
(wisdom, courage). We will not interpret them as individual names of properties (this idea is discussed by
Schnieder (2006, 15–17)) but as predicate terms having their extensions in the semantics of Zalta’s system.
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“backward” expressions are used by Zalta to speak about connections between
Meinongian abstract objects or Platonian forms and corresponding properties. He
also characterizes Leibnizian monads as coders which are “blueprints" of individuals
belonging to one-element extensions of some properties. Now, we bring this approach
into play and consider ideas representing adherences and forming the extension of
Bolzano’s Inbegriff.
We take a fragment of Zalta’s system theory, named here AOT.
The system AOT is expressed in a language consisting of individual terms (Tm) –
variables: x, y, z, ...; unary predicate terms (TM) – variables: F,G,H , ..., primitive
constant E! to be read: ... exists (concretely); binary constant =E used in contexts
with individual terms; logical symbols: ¬,→, ∀, λ and parentheses.
For t ∈ Tm and τ ∈ TM , the expressions: τ t are read: individual t exemplifies
the property τ or t has τ , and expressions: tτ – individual t encodes the property τ
or property τ determines t.
The set of all formulas consists of atomic formulas – expressions of the shape:
τ t , tτ , where τ may be λ term (λ forms a predicate term out of a formula; [λx.ϕ]
has as its intended meaning the predicate of fulfilling the formula ϕ), formulas of
shapes: t =E t ′ and all other expressions formed with the help of logical symbols in
a standard way.
Following Zalta’s terminology, by an encoding formula, we understand any
expression of the form tτ and by a propositional formula – every formula with
no encoding subformula and with no ∀ for predicate variables (but possibly with
quantifiers for individual variables).
We take α, β as representing individual or predicate variables. Symbol t represents
individual or predicate terms.
The theory AOT is based on the logic characterized by the following:
- classical propositional tautologies
- all formulas of the shape:
(∀1) ∀αϕ → ϕtα , t is substitutable for α
(∀2) ∀α(ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ∀αψ), α is not free in ϕ
(Compλ) [λx.ϕ] y ↔ ϕyx , where ϕ is a propositional formula.
Primitive rules are the following: (MP )  A → B, A =⇒  B
(R∀)  ϕ =⇒  ∀αϕ
Comprehension schema Compλ allows us to introduce λ terms, but with the
restriction on formulas occurring in the scope of λ, they should not contain encoding
subformulas and quantifiers bounding predicate variables.8
We adopt the following definitions of Zalta for the property of being abstract
object and for an intensional identity:
(D1) A!x =df [λy.¬E!y]x
(D2) F = G =df ∀x(xF ↔ xG)
8The restriction is sufficient to block Clark’s antinomy described by Zalta (1983, 158–159): the possibility
of introducing [λx.∃F(xF ∧ ¬Fx)] and [λx.∀F(xF → Fx)] would lead to contradiction in view of the
later introduced AOT proper axiom A3.
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The proper axioms of AOT are as follows:
(A1) x =E y ↔ E!x ∧ E!y ∧ ∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) (identity of concretes)
(A2) E!x → ¬∃F(xF) (no-coder, concretes are no-coders)
(A3) ∃x(A!x ∧ ∀F(xF ↔ ϕ)), x is not free in ϕ (being-so of A-objects)
(A4) α = β → (ϕα ↔ ϕ[βα]) (substantiation of identicals)
where the symbol = is understood as
(D3) x = y =df x =E y ∨ (A!x ∧ A!y ∧ ∀F(xF ↔ yF)) or as in D2.
Let us focus on the axiom A3 in the context of a certain difference between
Meinong’s and Bolzano’s ontology. Actually, the intention of Zalta was to formu-
late an intensional calculus which would contain a counterpart of a basic ontological
theorem accepted by Meinong, according to which “for every describable set of prop-
erties, there is an object which exemplifies just members of the set” (Zalta 1983, 6).9
This postulate expressed just in A3 is strictly connected with (or perhaps it is sim-
ply a version of) the known “principle of the independence of being from being-so”
which is an ontological radicalization of Twardowski’s conviction that it is possi-
ble to speak about non-existent objects of representations.10 Twardowski formulated
his theory of the contents and objects of representations being sure that he fol-
lowed Bolzano’s fundamental distinction of subjective ideas, objective ideas, and
their objects. He treated mental acts and their contents as counterparts of the Bolza-
nian subjective and objective ideas. Mental acts may have empty content but still they
have their objects. Actually, this was a neuralgic point of an incorrect interpretation
of Bolzano’s approach. Bolzano did not open the door for the Meinongian multitude
of fictional objects but claimed that if ideas in themselves have any objects, these are
real; otherwise, the idea is objectless and there are no fictional entities correspond-
ing to it (Künne 2003). These interpretative remarks show that Zalta’s theory in its
full power probably decides to much compared with original Bolzano’s approach, but
actually, this fact does not influence our research. In our context — we are focused
on the existence of real individuals — the question of the existence of inconsistent
ideal objects is irrelevant. Moreover, as we will see, it is possible to formulate the
analyzed argument without full axiom A3.11 Actually, the schema A3 leads to the
following:
(T1) ∃!x(A!x ∧ ∀F¬xF) (A3)
so we can introduce a constant for this abstract object which does not encode
anything:
(D4) x = 0 =df (A!x ∧ ∀F¬xF) (null)
9As it is shown by Zalta, a plausible formalization of this principle added to a sufficiently rich version of
the second-order classical logic results in a contradiction.
10In these explanations, we follow some interesting remarks of Künne (2003).
11We would say that A3 gives a logical way out of Meinong’s overabundance into which we do not get
standing on the ground of Bolzano’s ontology.
Bolzano’s Argument for the Existence of Substances
We notice that
(T2) ∀F¬xF ∧ ¬ x = 0 → E!x (D4, D1)
T2 states that every no-coder different from 0 is a concrete.
Analogously, we can introduce a name for the all-encoding abstract individual.
Interestingly, although in AOT, it is decided that both universes of properties and
of abstract objects are not empty, it is not settled if the universe of concretes is
non-empty.12 This fact fits our approach: Bolzano starts his argumentation with the
existence of adherences and argues for the existence of substances which we identify
with concrete objects in our later analysis.
In our formalization, we use the following definition of characterization of a
property:
(D5) xconF =df ∀G(xG ↔ G = F) (x characterizes F)
D5 is used by Zalta in his reconstruction of Plato’s theory of forms as a definition of
participation of ideas (Zalta 1983, 41).
As a theorem in AOT, we get
(T3) xconF ∧ xconG → F = G (D2, D5)
Thus, there is no individual which characterizes — is a characteristic coder of — two
(intensionally) different properties.
We can also note that for every property F , there is a characteristic coder
(T4a) ∀F∃x(xconF) (A3: ∀F∃x∀G(xG ↔ G = F) and D5)
To show the uniqueness of a characteristic coder of every property, we take the
following definition of ∃!:
(D6) ∃!xϕ =df ∃x
(
ϕ ∧ ∀y(ϕy → x = y)
)
Now, we have also
(T4b) ∀F∃!x(xconF)
Proof
1. xconF → ∀G(xG ↔ G = F) D5
2. xconF ∧ yconF → ∀G(xG ↔ yG) 1
3. xconF → A!x A2, D1
4. xconF ∧ yconF → A!x ∧ A!y 3
5. xconF ∧ yconF → ∀G(xG ↔ yG) ∧ A!x ∧ A!y 2, 4
6. xconF ∧ yconF → x = y D3, 5
7. ∀F∃!x(xconF) T4a, 6
12The assumed logic already guarantees that sets of properties and individuals are not empty, but it is not
determined if any individual is abstract or concrete.
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Let us introduce the following definition of inherence:
(D7) xεy =df ∃F(Fx ∧ ¬x = 0 ∧ yconF) (is)
It can be proved that
(T5) xεy ∧ yconF → Fx
Proof
1. yconF ∧ yconG → (Gx → Fx) T3, A4
2. Gx ∧ yconG → (yconF → Fx) 1
3. ∃G(Gx ∧ yconG) → (yconF → Fx) 2
4. x = 0 ∧ ∃G(Gx ∧ yconG) → (yconF → Fx) 3
5. xεy ∧ yconF → Fx D7, 4
T5 corresponds to the already mentioned Bolzano’s idea of reformulation of
subject-predicate sentences into sentences of the shape A has b. In our case, a sen-
tence xεy (x is y) may be transformed to Fx (x has F) if y is a characteristic coder of
F (Bolzano would say that if y is concretum of abstractum F ).
Let us now come back to the main approach.
AOT is an attractive frame for our analysis due to the morphology of its lan-
guage. We remind that Bolzano considered the schema A has b as a canonical form
of all propositions. If we considered Zalta’s “gerundive versions” of predicative
adjectives like “the property of being red” and “gerundive versions” of predica-
tive nouns like “the property of being an animal” (“the property of animality”) as
permissible instantiations of b, then we would come to some examples given by
Bolzano (cf. ft. 7). Now, “red object” and “animal” are names of concretes of the
considered abstracts (in Bolzano’s sense) and we name some of them “adherential
ideas”.
To express our version of Bolzano’s argument, we add to the language of AOT two
second-order constants B and Ad to be read ... is conditioned by something real, and
... is an adherence. We also extend our vocabulary by the specific predicate term In
for the property of being an intensional characterization of any adherence (or adher-
ential idea). In connection with the intended meaning of In, we have to recall the
restriction occurring in (Compλ). We want to use the name In for a certain property
possessed by characteristic coders of all adherences, that is the property described by
a coding formula with quantification over properties. In this situation, we weaken all
In substitutions of logical tautologies and schemata A3, A4 preceding them by the
formula
(IN) ∃!Z∀x(Zx ↔ ∃F(AdF ∧ xconF))
which we name the condition of consistency of the Inbegriff of all adherences.
For example, instead of (∀1), in case of In substitutions, we have
(∀1IN ) IN → (∀Fϕ → ϕInF )
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We interpret the universe of E! individuals as the set of substances and so we accept
the following definition:
(D8) Sx =df E!x (substance)
We remind that the term E! in Zalta’s approach has a different meaning than the term
“concrete” used by Bolzano. Bolzano was speaking about concrete ideas (not objects)
and concrete existence of adherences, complex substances, and their Inbegriffe.
Now, we propose the following proper axioms for our reconstruction of Bolzano’s
argumentation together with their paraphrases:
(AB0) IN → ∀x(Inx ↔ ∃F(AdF ∧ xconF))
If the Inbegriff of all adherences is consistent, then x has this property (In)
iff x characterizes some adherence.
(AB1) ∃xSx ∨ ∃FAdF
There exists something real: a substance or an adherence.
(AB2) IN → (∃xInx → BIn)
If the Inbegriff of all adherences is consistent, then it is conditioned by
something real, if it is attributed to anything.
(AB3) ∀F(BF → ∀x(Fx → Sx) ∨ ∃x(Fx ∧ ∃y(yεx ∧ ¬Fy)))
Every property F which is conditioned by something real, is attributed to a
substance or to something which is an attribute of y which is not F .
(AB4) IN → (Inx ∧ ¬xconS ∧ ¬Iny ∧ yεx → ∃z(yεz ∧ zconS))
If the Inbegriff of all adherences is consistent, then if it is attributed to indi-
vidual x which does not characterize a substance, but which is an attribute
of some individual y which is not an adherential idea, then y is a subject of
the idea characterizing a substance.
The main theorem, which we consider as the subject of the proof, is
ThS. IN → ∃xSx
If there exists the collection of all adherential ideas, then there exists at least
one substance.
Proof
1. ∃xSx ∨ ∃FAdF AB1 (=1a ∨ 1b)
1b. ∃FAdF ass
2. ∃F∃x(AdF ∧ xconF) T4a, 1b
3. IN → ∃xInx AB0, 2
4. IN → BIn AB2, 3
5. IN → (BIn → ∀x(Inx → Sx) ∨ ∃x(Inx ∧ ∃y(yεx ∧ ¬Iny))) AB3, ∀1IN
6. IN → ∀x(Inx → Sx) ∨ ∃x(Inx ∧ ∃y(yεx ∧ ¬Iny)) 4, 5
6a. IN → ∀x(Inx → Sx) ass
7. IN → ∀x(Inx → ∃FxconF) AB0
8. IN → ∀x(Inx → ∃FxF) D5, 7
9. IN → ∀x(Inx → ¬Sx) 8, A2, D8
10. IN → ∃x(Inx ∧ ∃y(yεx ∧ Iny)) 6, 6a, 9
11. IN → ∃x(Inx ∧ ∃y(yεx ∧ Iny) ∧ (xconS ∨ ¬xconS)) 10
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11a. IN → ∃x(Inx ∧ ∃y(yεx ∧ Iny) ∧ xconS)) ass
12. yεx ∧ xconS → Sy T5
13. IN → ∃xSx 11a, 12 (IN → 1a)
11b. IN → ∃x(Inx ∧ ∃y(yεx ∧ Iny) ∧ ¬xconS)) ass
14. IN → ∃y∃z(yεz ∧ zconS) AB4, 11b
15. IN → ∃ySy 14, 12 (IN → 1a)
Let us picture the structure of the proof:
To notice the connections between the original text of Bolzano and our recon-
struction, first, we pay attention to axiom AB0. It is the conditional definition of
In intended to describe the meaning of Inbegriff considered by Bolzano in sen-
tence [4] from the analyzed fragment of Athanasia. Axiom AB1 is a formalization
of the antecedents of implication [1] which is then repeated in [6] as a premise. The
mentioned separation of two types of reals substances and adherences is already prej-
udiced by our language: we use for them variables of different sorts. AB2 is meant
to express the statement from [4]: the Inbegriff composed of adherences is condi-
tioned by something real. AB3 is a weaker version of the second part of sentence
[2] and sentence [3]. Bolzano claims that the conditionality of adherences (so: real
properties) presupposes other reals, but these may be substances or again other (real)
properties. The possibility of speaking about properties of properties is expressed in
our theory by the fact that some properties may be attached to characteristic coders
of other properties. In AB3, we express only a necessary (and not sufficient) require-
ment for being a property conditioned by something real, which is to be a property
founded on substances or (at least) to be attached to a coder characterizing another
property which is attached to individuals not belonging to the extension of this first
property. Finally, AB4 — which may be called principle of substantial foundation of
In — validates [5] and allows us to obtain the main conclusion. The important point
is that in our reconstruction, we reach a weaker conclusion that of Bolzano. Indeed,
by the restriction in Compλ, the formula IN is not an AOT thesis. We take it as the
antecedents of these formulas in which the constant In is used: AB0, AB2, and AB4.
Finally, IN is also the antecedents of implication ThS.13
Commenting the deductive power needed to obtain our argument, we can note
that in our derivation, axiom A2 and theorems T4a and T5 are used essentially.
Axiom A2 would be accepted by Bolzano: certainly, substances are not ideas. T5
13To show the consistency of our formalism, we sketch a model of it at the end of our considerations.
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follows the Bolzanian idea of transformation of subject-predicate sentences into the
canonical form. The acceptance of T4a may be problematic because of its inferen-
tial dependency on the powerful axiom A3. In any case, if we would be inclined
to reduce this power, we could introduce the weakening of T4a as a special axiom:
∀F(AdF → ∃x(xconF)) and the proof of ThS would work.
Now, let us return to the already mentioned inspiration and few interesting sim-
ilarities between the analyzed argumentation from Athanasia and the argument for
the existence of God from Lehrbuch der Religionwissenschaft (1834, 177–179). We
take in account the exposition of the latter given by S´wie˛torzecka (2014). The for-
mal basis of this approach is the system expressed in the language of the ZF theory
extended by predicate  for the part relation. For convenience, in the following foot-
note, we draft the assumed theory originally formulated by A. Pietruszczak (2000,
172–181).14 The considered formalization uses two primitive one-place predicates:
W and B to be read: is real and is conditioned, as well a two-place predicate R — is
a condition of.
Specific axioms are as follows:
(AβG) ∀x(Gx ↔ Wx ∧ ¬Bx) (x is God)
(Aβ0) Zb ∧ ∀x(x	b ↔ Wx ∧ Bx)
All real conditioned things form a set
(Aβ1) ∃xWx
There is something real
(Aβ2) ∀v∀y(vσy ∧ ∀z(z	y → Wz) → Wv)15
Each mereological sum of real objects is real
(Aβ3) ∀x∀y(Wx ∧ yRx → Wy)
Conditions of real objects are real
(Aβ4) ∀x(Bx → ∃y(yRx ∧ (y  x ∨ ∃z(z  x ∧ zRy))))16
If x is conditioned, then x has some condition which is disjoint with x or
this condition is conditioned by an object which is also disjoint with x.
The proof of ∃xGx goes in a similar way to our derivation of ThS. At first, we
assume that b is an empty set, then because of Aβ1 and AβG, we get ∃xGx. If b
is not empty, then it may be formed the mereological sum v of b: ∀y(y	b → y 
v) ∧ ∀y(y  v → ∃u(u	b ∧ u ◦ y)) (on the ground of ∀z(∃y(y	z) → ∃x(xσz))),
14We obtain it by adding the following mereological axioms and definitions to ZF:
(asym) ∀x∀y(x  y → ¬(y  x)) (asymmetry of part relation)
(trans) ∀x∀y∀z(x  y ∧ y  z → x  z) (transitivity of the part relation)
(ing) x  y ↔ x  y ∨ x = y (ingrediens)
(overlap) x ◦ y ↔ ∃z(z  x ∧ z  y) (overlapping)
(dis) x  y ↔ ¬(x ◦ y) (disjointness)
(σ ) xσz ↔ Zz ∧ ∀y(y	z → y  x) ∧ ∀y(y  x → ∃u(u	z ∧ u ◦ y)) (the mereological sum)
(ext) ∀x∀y∀z(xσz ∧ yσz → x = y) (extensionality)
(∗) ∀z(∃y(y	z) → ∃x(xσz)) (there are only mereological sums of something)
(at) ∀z(Zz → ¬∃x(x  z)) (sets do not have parts)
15Cf. (σ ) in ft. 14.
16Cf. (dis) in ft. 14.
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which is the formal counterpart of Inbegriff of all conditioned beings. From specific
axioms Aβ2–Aβ4, we get again ∃xGx.
We start our comparison with a comment on two central collections: the Inbegriff
of all adherences and the Inbegriff of all real conditioned individuals (totum reale).
The first one is defined by AB0 and the second one is a mereological sum formed
from set b described by Aβ0. Both totalities have different ontological status — the
former is conceived of as a certain property (with some extension which is a distribu-
tive set) and the latter is an individual (perhaps it is meant as a complex substance).
However, they are considered in frame of quite similar theories from the formal point
of view. Our AB1 expresses essentially the same content as Aβ1. The notion of being
conditioned by something real symbolized here by B has similar properties as a com-
bination of two primitive notions from the latter reconstruction noted by predicates is
real and is conditioned. Axioms Aβ2 and Aβ3 express the requirement that should
be met by the property of being real, and AB2 and AB3 play the same role concern-
ing the property of being conditioned by something real. It may be noted that Aβ2 is
more general than the corresponding AB2 in this sense that in Aβ2, any mereological
sum of real objects (and so also this one formed from b) is described, and in AB2, we
do not speak about any collection of adherential ideas, but only about the maximal
one named In. Finally, we compare the crucial axiom Aβ4 whith AB4. The first one
is a foundation principle applied to any conditioned individual x (thus also to totum
reale), which guarantees the reality of existential conditions disjoint with x. AB4 is
“a more modest" version of Aβ4 because it speaks only about the substantial foun-
dation of In and again not about any collection of adherential ideas. Despite all these
similarities, we should also note certain important difference which comes from the
theories lying behind the compared reconstructions. The mereological theory of sets
and individuals used by S´wie˛torzecka (2014) is strong enough to guarantee the exis-
tence of the set of all real conditioned things, from which the mereological whole can
be formed (every non-empty set has its mereological sum). Zalta’s theory does not
give us a corresponding principle for properties: the possibility of introducing names
for properties is restricted in Compλ, and in connection with this, we had to take in
account our condition IN . Our cautious formalization may be now interpreted in the
semantics designed by D. Scott for the monadic fragment of Zalta’s theory.
We sketch Scott’s approach following Zalta (1983, 160–162).
For any set of concrete objects E (possibly empty), Scott considers the set of prop-
erties R = {r : r =: +α, for α ⊆ 2E }. The set of all subsets of R is a domain of
abstract objects and it forms with the set of E the set of all individuals: D = 2R ∪ E .
There are defined two functions extr : R → 2D and int : R → 2D which assign to
every property its extension and intension according to the following conditions:
1. o ∈ extr(r) ⇔ (i) ∃e∈E (o = e and ∃α(r = +α and e ∈ α))
or (ii) ∃a∈2R (o = a and ∃α(r = +α)),
2. o ∈ int (r) ⇔ (i) ∃e∈E (o = e and r = r) or (ii) ∃a∈2R (o = a and r ∈ a).
For any given < E, R,D, extr, int >, we consider valuation function v which takes
as arguments individual terms or predicate terms and assigns them respectively ele-
ments of D and R, the constant predicate E! has constant valuation −E . The formula
τ t is true under valuation v iff v(t) ∈ extr(v(τ )) and the formula tτ is true under
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valuation v iff v(t) ∈ int (v(τ )). Further truth conditions are described in a standard
way. A formula ϕ is valid if it is true for every valuation. Scott’s semantic validates
the monadic fragment of Zalta theory.17
In frame of this semantics, we sketch a model for our axioms. We take the
set of concrete objects E = {s}. In this case, the set of relations is R∗ =
{+∅,−∅,+{s},−{s}}. The set of all objects is D = 2R ∪ E , so here D∗ = 2R∗ ∪ {s}.
We interpret our symbols Ad and B as sets: Ad∗ = {−{s}} and B∗ = Ad∗ ∪{+∅}. In
our case, the semantic counterpart of the term S is −{s} (−{s} ∈ Ad∗), ext (−{s}) =
{s} and int (−{s}) = {X : X = {−{s}} or {−{s}} ⊆ X}. Now, axioms AB1 and AB3
are true. It is also true that ∃FBF . Axioms AB0, AB2, and AB4 are also true just
because IN is not fulfilled. It is easy to check that none of the four elements of R∗
is a candidate for making our IN true. Probably, the general construction of Scott’s
semantics does not allow us to consider such properties as formulated in IN . But
of course, that does not mean that IN causes a contradiction. Actually, if we found
another semantics with models of a relatively weak fragment of AOT (required for
our derivation of ThS) verifying AB1, AB3, and IN ˘ so, schowing that the Inbe-
griff of all adherences understood as In is consistent ˘ then it would be possible to
strengthen our axioms AB0, AB2, and AB4 by deleting IN and constructing the
argument for the main thesis without the special assumption IN . However, this issue
remains open in our present discussion.
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